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This paper presents some methodological problems with computing sole, synthetic measure of company’s 
safeguard against the hostile takeover. Such a measure could be useful in further researches concerning 
financial effects of introducing, removing or existing of antitakeover charter provisions. Commonly used 
measures suffer for inadequacy to other countries law systems and for disregarding some theoretical con-
straints. From these weaknesses the general proposals on how to design the “right” index results. 
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1. Introduction. The basic corporate docu-
ment – the charter – may contain regulations that 
make the takeover more difficult for any or 
some parties. These regulations are not made 
only for deterring hostile raiders. But even if 
they are created for other purposes, their side act 
is distracting the corporation as a target of hos-
tile takeover. The hostile takeover is a process of 
gaining control over a company by purchasing 
enough its shares to decide on company’s gen-
eral activity and key positions in board and 
management, which process is not welcome by 
the incumbent firm’s authority. 
Antitakeover charter provisions can be a part 
of defending system. Their function is described 
best by a chapter’s title from Bruce Was-
serstain’s Big deal: the battle for control of 
America’s leading – “Defense: Building the Bat-
tlements” [31, p. 684]. Antitakeover provisions 
are similar to battlements: they make defense 
easier and defer aggressors. It should be noted, 
that companies can be defended in many ways. 
The most often applied classification uses a time 
dimension. This classification divides all anti-
takeover measures into two categories: preventa-
tive and active measures. The measures from the 
first group are designed to discourage a potential 
acquirer, thus they are applied before any takeo-
ver attempt. The second group encompasses de-
vices used against defined suitor. 
Preventative measures act as a kind of barri-
ers to takeovers and sometimes are called tech-
nical barriers
1
 Other names often used are: anti-
takeover charter amendments, porcupine provi-
sions and shark repellents. Some scientists also 
rate poison pills
2
 among preventative measures, 
but it seems that this kind of device is something 
between preventative and active measures. They 
are adopted before the takeover attempt occurs 
(just like preventative ones), but are triggered 
and activated after a specific event, that is in 
most cases a bid announcement or purchasing 
e.g. 30 percent of company’s shares by an ag-
gressor (like active measures). What is important 
– poison pills can stay inactive if the board de-
cides so. 
                                                 
1
 The second type of barriers is called structural bar-
riers. They are effect of general structure of the eco-
nomic and law conditions. Structural barriers encom-
pass among other: the size of capital market, the dis-
persion of ownership, the significance of financial 
institution and so on. Although it seems the structural 
barriers differ countries, in fact companies within the 
confines of one country can differ as regards to some 
structural barriers – e.g. dispersion of ownership. See: 
Ferrarini [12, p. 5], It has to be noted there is another 
understanding of those types of barriers, see Ferrell 
[13, pp. 2-6]. 
2
 According to Dawson, Pence and Stone [8; p. 423) 
poison pills refer to various measures that are imple-
mented through the issuance of a pro rata dividend to 
common stockholders of stock or rights to acquire 
stock and/or other securities of an issuer or, under 
certain circumstances, a person or group (“Acquir-
ing Person”) involved in a business combination with 
an issuer. […] The poison pill may exclude Acquiring 
Person from the exercise of such rights. 
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This paper focuses on possibility to create a 
mathematical formula that will replace the num-
ber of shark repellents commonly used in re-
searches concerning financial effects of anti-
takeover protection. It must be noted that all 
analyses conducted in this paper and formulas 
deriving from them are prepared for Polish legal 
limitations so cannot be used to other countries 
conditions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 
2 I consider the acting of shark repellents as an 
antitakeover measure in charters of Polish pub-
licly traded companies. Section 3 presents some 
findings of previous researches concerning con-
sequences of technical barriers and measures 
used to esteem the level of company’s protec-
tion. In section 4 I present disadventages of sim-
ple indices commonly used and requirements for 
useful synthetic defense index.  
2. Antitakeover provisions in Polish public 
companies’ charters 
A number of shark repellents have been listed 
in the American literature for few decades (see: 
18; 15; 26, pp. 343–364; 14, pp. 162–172; 31, 
pp. 700–709; 32, pp. 236–240; 6, pp. 834–836). 
Such considerable literature creates the tempta-
tion to transfer literally one or another classifica-
tion to the legal soil of another country, but this 
manner of acting is unacceptable. Some repel-
lents existing in United States cannot be adopted 
for example in Poland, where there mustn’t be 
any limitation of right to call special sharehold-
ers meetings, while in USA that kind of re-
striction is recalled in the literature (18, p. 540; 
15, p. 782). The Polish commerce code empow-
ers a group of shareholders having at least 10 
percent of emitted stock to call a special meet-
ing, and the charter can only relax this condition. 
Shark repellents can deter hostile raiders by 
signaling that the takeover attempt could face 
some problems during two stages of the process: 
(A) the purchasing of shares and (B) gaining 
control over company. 
First, charter provisions can make the pur-
chase of a desirable number of shares more dif-
ficult by raising the quantity of stock that can 
give a shareholder the majority of votes during 
shareholders meeting, or by limiting “free mar-
ket” for company’s shares. In Polish publicly 
traded companies’ charters three general types 
of shark repellents from this group are noted: 
Unequal voting power. Polish law admits the 
existing of shares with superior voting power 
only if they have no more than 2 votes. But there 
is one exception – shares issued before 2001 are 
still valid even though they have up to 5 voices 
per share. A person or a company trying to take 
another company over is forced to buy more 
than 50% of all shares to be sure that in share-
holders’ meeting will have a majority of votes. 
An acquiring part can buy preference shares but 
it may be more costly and more difficult. 
1. Shares transfer restrictions. Inscribed 
stocks (including the ones with superior voting 
rights) can be excluded from regular trading. A 
company charter can define some conditions 
under which this kind of stock could be pur-
chased. The most common are: 
 Approval of transfer concerning 
inscribed stock. This right is typically given to 
company’s authorities or other owners of in-
scribed stock. Without this permission a transac-
tion could be illegal or could cause a deprivation 
of privileges. Sometimes an entitled entity has 
power to determine the buyer. 
 Pre–emption right for defined 
shareholders or other entities (e.g. employees). 
 Strict deprivation of privileges 
after transaction involving inscribed stock. 
 Determined price of transaction 
(for example the price sometimes is defined at 
the level of issue price, which can keep owners 
from selling). 
2. Limited voting power. This kind of 
charter provision can prohibit a shareholder 
from realizing voting power from all owned 
shares. Typically, there is a specific percentage 
(e. g. 20%) of all votes that cannot be exceeded 
(not in the term of possessing, but exercising) by 
single shareholder. Under the Polish law this 
kind of provision can be applied only for a 
shareholder having more than 20% of all shares. 
Theoretically, gaining over 50% of votes at 
shareholders meeting is not impossible because 
of some shareholders’ absence or the possibility 
to purchase amount of shares big enough to 
leave other owner with less than percentage de-
fined in the charter (that means for example 
more than 80% if the voting power is limited to 
20% of maximum votes at the meeting). A char-
ter can exclude from restriction some owners, 
e.g. company’s founders. 
Controlling majority of votes at shareholders 
meeting means that a controlling party can pass 
many important resolutions, but it does not mean 
the company is taken over. The second stage of 
a takeover process consists in turning the capital 
control into the real control. The real control 
refers to having majority in company’s authori-
ties or leading to a combination with acquirer. In 
two–tier boards system – like in Poland or Ger-
many – shareholders at the meeting elect mem-
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bers of the supervisory board. The board repre-
sents the shareholders, monitors the board of 
managing directors, delegates managing direc-
tors, and has the power to decide in cases of ex-
traordinary matters. The second group of shark 
repellents makes the replacing the incumbent 
supervisory board (and controlling the managing 
board) with acquirer’s delegates more difficult. 
There are six general types of antitakeover 
provisions in this group: 
1. Supermajority. According to Polish law 
merger between two or more public companies 
requires supermajority of 2/3 votes of each en-
gaged corporations’ shareholders meetings. A 
charter amendment can require more strict con-
ditions. These conditions encompass strict su-
permajority and raised quorum as well. 
2.  Heterogeneous board. A charter can ex-
clude a number of board’s seats from sharehold-
er meeting election. In practice in means that 
some members of supervisory board can be 
elected by specified shareholder or group of 
shareholders, by employees, by outside institu-
tion (e. g. a scientific institute) or by a share-
holder who as first exceeded a specific share in 
firm’s capital (regardless of subsequent de-
crease). Such provision limits the power of a 
majority shareholder of electing a majority of 
board’s members. 
3. Electing the board by a “groups’ vot-
ing”. Groups’ voting in its principle is similar to 
American cumulative voting. In this mode of 
election shareholders form as many groups 
(equal by votes power) as many board’s mem-
bers have to be elected and each group delegate 
one person to the board. Some authors among 
shark repellents rate not cumulative voting but 
elimination of it (e.g. 16, p.39), arguing that 
elimination of cumulative voting may introduce 
a threat that unwelcome investor having less 
than 50% of votes could be completely separated 
from control. It is important to note, that a raider 
planning a corporate takeover can’t think about 
one or two seats in nine–member board, but ra-
ther at least five seats. It means that cumulative 
voting as well as “groups’ voting” should be 
regarded as a shark repellent. Polish commerce 
code empowers group of shareholders control-
ling at least 20% of capital to demand this way 
of election. A charter can only lessen this 
threshold. 
4. Staggered board. In staggered board its 
members are divided into some groups and dur-
ing the annual meeting shareholders can replace 
one of these groups. Probably the most common 
number of group is three, so every group is 
elected every third year. This mode of election 
prevents the board from being replaced immedi-
ately after the capital control over a company is 
taken by the raider. Even with over 50 percent of 
votes at shareholder meeting the acquirer can 
replace at the next meeting only 1/3 of board 
members with his own nominees. Taking whole 
control may take two or three years. Staggered 
board creates two kinds of threats for a raider. 
First, the planned, positive effects of takeover 
can be postponed, thus the target looks like risky 
business. Second, the target authorities may take 
some actions that could harm the acquirer, e.g. 
buy or sell assets, increase debt or (in the United 
States) adopt poison pills [3, part III]. In Polish 
publicly traded corporations, except staggered 
boards, there is similar mechanism to make a 
part of board entrenched – it consists in a speci-
fied tenure for every board member thus, in fact, 
it can make a board staggered. 
5. Board changes restrictions. Heterogene-
ous or staggered board may not to be strong anti-
takeover measure if there is the way to evade 
these provisions. It can be made by packing the 
board or shorten the tenure of board. The general 
rule empowers shareholder meeting to do it, but 
sometimes charters make it difficult or impossi-
ble. Charter provisions can limit shareholders’ 
discretion in shaping the board by: 
 Supermajority rules for dismiss-
ing board members (including quorum rules). 
 Special requirements for at least 
a part of board members. The most common 
requirements are: Polish citizenship and inde-
pendence (defined in various ways). Although 
some kinds of these requirements are easy to be 
evaded, they sometimes can be a good reason for 
litigation. 
 Strict procedures for replacing 
incumbent board members. Such kinds of proce-
dures can, for instance, require a shareholder to 
have specific share at previous meeting to set a 
candidate for board member at current meeting 
(note that such provision is similar to staggered 
board), or a minority shareholders’ (e.g. 20 per-
cent of votes made up of entities having sepa-
rately no more than 3 percent) proposal for in-
dependent board member dismissal, or simple 
prohibition on dismissal of board members 
without any cause. 
 Preventing the raider from pack-
ing the board. Acquirers can try to add some 
members to the board without dismissing in-
cumbents. If the operation has “big enough 
size”, a raider can gain the control over the 
board in accordance with the rules… unless ad-
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ditional rules work. A charter can precisely state 
the number of board members, or limit this 
number. If a maximum number of board mem-
bers is stated and there is no vacating, packing 
the board becomes impossible. 
 Nominating a board member’s 
replacement. Shareholders can simultaneously 
nominate board members and their substitutes, 
thus, if any member is dismissed or have re-
signed, a successor can’t be elected, because a 
replacement becomes a successor. To prevent 
substitutes from being dismissed, some provi-
sions like supermajority can be applied as well. 
6. Difficulties with replacing managing di-
rectors. Even if the acquirer controls the super-
visory board (having a slight majority) it can be 
unable to control current company’s operations 
that require controlling managing directors. It is 
also important, because possible merger plan has 
to be created by managing directors. Thus man-
aging directors who cannot be fired means lim-
ited control of acquirer. Provisions that prevent 
managing directors from being fired are as fol-
lows: 
 A charter may empower em-
ployees or other third party to nominate one or 
more managing directors; these nominees are 
excluded from shareholders and board power. 
 Supermajority rule for dismiss-
ing managing directors (including quorum pro-
visions) 
Provisions noted above can have different in-
tensities. For instance a company with inscribed 
stock with five votes giving 40 percent of all 
votes at shareholders meeting is protected better 
than a similar company with such shares giving 
only 10 percent of votes; managing directors 
who can be dismissed by supervisory board in 
presence of at least ¾ members are better pro-
tected than managers who can be fired by deci-
sion of half a board. Nevertheless the level of 
shark repellents’ antitakeover force is generally 
omitted in researches. 
3. The effects of shark repellents 
Existance of shark repellents is blamed for 
many disadvantages. By protecting firm’s au-
thorities from removing by hostile bidder as well 
as by insurgent shareholders, they can harm 
shareholders by [1, pp.8–9]: 
 Motivating directors to act in their own 
interest. Protected directors prefer building em-
pires and extracting private benefits rather than 
serving company in shareholders’ interest. On 
the other hand, the protections can raise direc-
tors’ incentives to run long–term projects what 
could be better for owners of the corporation. 
 Lowering the probability of acquisition. 
The strong antitakeover protection repel poten-
tial bidder and insolate shareholders from takeo-
ver premia. On the other hand, loyal directors 
can reject an acquisition offer when the price is 
inadequate and serve shareholder by this action. 
 Lowering the premia. The takeover pro-
cess costs, thus, even if an acquirer decides to 
set a bid for some target’s shares, the price will 
be probably lower because successful purchas-
ing not always means taking control. As we have 
seen above, postponing positive effects of take-
over can cause the value of acquisition to be 
negative, and the best way to avoid this situation 
is setting the lower price. 
All three possible mechanisms can limit mar-
ket valuation of protected firms. This point of 
view is called managerial entrenchment hypoth-
esis. 
On the contrary – there is also shareholders 
interest hypothesis, considering shark repellents 
as a set of mechanisms that allows management 
focus on long–term goals and as a result increas-
es financial performances of a company and its 
valuation. Additionally protected incumbents 
can bargain the higher premia from an acquirer.  
Several studies investigated the influence of 
shark repellents and similar mechanisms (like 
poison pills and antitakeover state statues) on 
financial features of companies. There have been 
two main approaches used for this purpose. First 
is the event study that shows differences be-
tween the dependent variable (e.g. stock price) 
before and after the examined event. Frequently 
used example of this approach is cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR). The method-
ology of CAAR was described e.g. by Eckbo 
[10, pp. 152–154]. He [10, pp. 176–182] as well 
as Coates [7, pp. 330–339], discusses some stud-
ies on shark repellents. This method consists in 
examining objects at different moments that 
have the common feature – adoption of an anti-
takeover amendment. In the second approach 
differences between companies with different 
protection level are examined. All research ob-
jects have to be at the same time point, but they 
differ with regard to an examined factor. 
Johnson and Rao [21] didn’t find antitakeo-
ver amendments to have an impact on firm’s 
financial performance. Meulbroek et. al. [25] 
found that firms after adopting antitakeover 
amendments decrease industry–adjusted 
R&D/sales ratio by 5.99 percent during two 
years surrounding the year of adoption (–1,1), by 
11.46 percent during three years window (–1,2) 
and by 12.04 percent during four year window 
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(–1,3). This suggests that entrenched directors 
can be more myopic than directors threatened by 
takeover. Mahoney, Sundaramurthy, and Ma-
honey [24] found weak proof for decreasing of 
long–term investment following the adoption of 
antitakeover amendments. They also searched 
for impact of absolute protection on investment. 
Coefficient described as “number previously 
adopted” turned out to be negative, but insignifi-
cant. On the other hand, the number of concur-
rently adopted was significant. It suggests that 
number of all adopted antitakeover measures can 
be as important as adoption of every one of 
them. Rose [27] found that Danish firms effec-
tively protected by charters provisions had high-
er investment/total assets ratio than other firms, 
but coefficient was not statistically different 
from zero. 
Bebchuck, Coates, and Subramanian [3] 
found that firms protected by staggered board 
are less likely to be taken over, but there were no 
statistically significant differences in returns 
observed. However, the key factor turned out to 
be the probability of being taken over, thus the 
staggered board costs the shareholders 9.2% less 
in returns. 
DeAngelo and Rice [9] didn’t find the price 
changes around date of antitakeover amend-
ments announcement as statistically significant. 
Linn and McConnell [23] did more research fo-
cusing on different dates, e.g. announcement 
day, board approval date and shareholders meet-
ing date. They also investigated changes of char-
ters that decreased antitakeover protection. Their 
main conclusion was that “antitakeover amend-
ments are proposed by managers who seek to 
increase the value of the firm and are approved 
by shareholders who share that objective”. Jar-
rel and Poulsen [19] examined cumulative ab-
normal returns around the announcements of 
shark repellents proxy date. They found negative 
average CAR for these announcements. Com-
paring effects of different types of repellents, 
they found insignificant negative influence of 
fair price amendment and statistically significant 
negative influence of other provisions. Kabir, 
Cantrijn, and Jeunink [22], using similar meth-
od, found that announcement of issuing new pre-
ferred stock by Dutch listed companies had a 
negative effect on shareholders wealth, but there 
were significant differences between sub–
samples based on the three steps followed in the 
issuing process. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
[16] found out that investing in firms with strong 
antitakeover technical barriers brought in 1990s 
lower rate than investing in firms with weaker 
protection.  They also discovered that increase 
of antitakeover provision by one was associated 
with the Tobin’s Q factor lowering by 2.4 (8.9 in 
the end of last decade of 20
th
 century) percent-
age point. Bebchuk and Cohen [2] focused on 
wealth effects of staggered boards and other an-
titakeover charter provisions listed by Gompers 
and others. They discovered that both staggered 
board and other provisions are effective ways to 
lower the market valuation of firm (measured by 
Tobin’s Q factor). 
Generally, we can observe diverse findings 
concerning the effect of antitakeover charter 
provisions and the dispute between proponents 
of both hypotheses is far from being settled. 
Even studies conducted by the same scholars on 
comparable sample with the same method in 
different moments can bring different results 
[29, pp. 127–132; 30]. 
For this paper the key problem is how to 
measure the strength of protection given by spe-
cific set of shark repellents. It is important for 
both research strategies: event studies and dif-
ferences approach. 
4. Measuring the protection  
The most common approach to compute the 
protection index is a simple adding one to an-
other existing provision and the number of pro-
visions treat as protection index. This method 
was used by Babchuk et al [3] or Gompers et al 
[16]. The composition of such indices can differ 
in terms of the number of shark repellents provi-
sion used by authors. For example Bebchuk et al 
used 6–element list of antitakeover charter pro-
visions while Gompers et al constructed Gov-
ernance Index based on 24 charters provision 
that strengthen and weaken directors’ position 
and – consequently – the threat of takeovers. 
Such an approach is easy and simple in use, so 
frequently met (28; 4; 11; 20; 5; 17; 29; 30). 
However indices built on this way of thinking 
(let’s name them simple indices) have some 
weaknesses: (I) omits the nature of a provision, 
(IIa) equally values all provisions, (IIb) disre-
gards the law of diminishing marginal utility, 
and (III) omits potential synergies between pro-
visions. 
First of all (I) simple indices regard all provi-
sions taken into consideration as discrete, one–
null factors that could be observed or not ob-
served in a company’s charter. However some of 
antitakeover provisions can have more than 2 
values (especially shark repellents from first 
group presented in section 2) and thus can be 
graded. 
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Within the simple index all factors are equal 
valued and this creates two other disadvantages 
of such approach. Primarily (IIa) a company 
with inscribed stocks giving 60% of votes in 
shareholders meeting is better protected than a 
company with special requirements concerning 
one (of seven or nine) board member. In a sim-
ple index both companies’ protection level could 
be graded at the same level. The second (IIb) 
problem coming from equal valuation is disre-
garding the law of diminishing marginal utility.  
Even if two or more antitakeover provisions 
with the same strength are introduced in the 
charter, the overall protection of a company 
doesn’t have to be simply the number of used 
provisions, because marginal utilities of addi-
tional repellents could be decreasing. 
The third problem (III) is opposite to the 
weakness IIb – between selected factors there 
could be the synergy observed. For example – as 
mentioned in section 2, heterogeneous board can 
strengthen the power of group voting provision. 
Separately considered such provision could be 
assessed as weak, but it gain some power when 
the board member (or members) nominated by 
non–shareholders became the key voter(s) in the 
board. 
The good and useful synthetic defense index 
thus must: 
1. Take into account the legal system of the 
country of origin – the commerce code and other 
laws should be the basis of the analysis 
2. Use different weights for listed factors – 
provisions with strong antitakeover potential 
should be highly weighted. Identification of such 
factors is uneasy, but possible   
3. Take into account the characters of fac-
tors – some factors are discrete (e.g. board can 
be staggered or not), some could be easily grad-
ed (e.g. percentage of limited voting power), and 
some are composed of a set of possible mecha-
nisms (e.g. board changes restrictions) 
4. Include the synergy and the law of di-
minishing marginal utility. 
Such an index seems to be the better measure 
for further research on financial effects of shark 
repellents. 
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ШИМАНСКИ Марек 
 
СОСТАВЛЕНИЕ СИНТЕТИЧЕСКОГО ЗАЩИТНОГО ИНДЕКСА.  
НЕКОТОРЫЕ МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ ЗАМЕЧАНИЯ ПО ПОСТРОЕНИЮ МЕРЫ 
ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ ПРОЧНОСТИ ПРЕВЕНТИВНЫХ ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ УСТАВА 
 
В статье рассмотрены некоторые методологические проблемы, связанные с вычислительной 
основой синтетического метода измерения защищенности компании от недружественного по-
глощения. Такой метод может быть полезным для дальнейших исследований, касающихся финан-
совых последствий введения, удаления или изменения противопоглотительных мер в Уставе ком-
пании. Традиционно используемые методы не учитывают особенности систем права стран и не 
учитывают некоторые теоретические ограничения. С учетом этих недостатков приводятся 
предложения с целью достигнуть «правильных» значений показателей. 
Ключевые слова: методологические проблемы, финансовые последствия, Устав компании, син-
тетический индекс защиты, поглощение.  
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